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This article analyses the conditions under which political parties spend attention to labour issues. This article compares
the dominant partisan perspective, which proposes that attention to issues is shaped by party competition, to an interest
group perspective, which proposes that strong interest groups, in particular when their power is institutionalized in
corporatist systems, can force parties to spend attention to their issue. We use the Comparative Agenda Project data set
of election manifestos to examine these patterns in seven West-European countries and corroborate our findings in the
Comparative Manifesto Project data set for 25 countries. The evidence supports the interest group perspective over
the partisan perspective. This shows that the study of party attention to issues should not isolate party competition from
the influence of other political actors.
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Introduction
Issue competition has taken a flight in the study of party
politics over the last decade (Green-Pedersen, 2019a;
Hobolt and de Vries, 2015; Klüver and Spoon, 2016; Meyer
and Wagner, 2016). The central idea is that political parties
compete to determine the issues that will be put on the
agenda because some issues are beneficial to them while
others are not (Carmines and Stimson, 1990: 6). So far, the
issue competition literature has found that parties try to
focus on the issues they ‘own’ and that they seek to force
their competitors to pay attention to such issues (Dolezal
et al., 2013; Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2015; Meyer
and Wagner, 2016; Sigelman and Buell, 2004). The domi-
nant focus within the study of issue competition has thus
been on the way in which political parties react to each
other’s issue emphasis.
This perspective sets political competition apart from
other political actors. Yet, political parties do not compete
with each other in a vacuum. In the same way as political
parties, interest groups are important intermediary
organizations between the citizenry and the government
(Rasmussen et al., 2014), and they specifically work to
affect the political agenda. However, with one notable
exception (Klüver, 2018), the role of interest groups in
issue competition has received limited attention. This may
be reasonable in relation to some issues such as European
integration where interest groups play a limited role (Van
de Wardt, 2015). However, when it comes to issues such as
labour market policy or agriculture where interest groups
are strong, the issue competition literature is sparse.
This article, therefore, aims to investigate which factors
shape party attention to labour market policy. We focus on
labour market policy because this is a good example of an
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issue where we can test both the partisan perspective and
the interest group perspective. We can easily identify par-
ties and interest groups that own labour market issues, that
is, centre-left parties, labour parties and trade unions
(Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013; Seeberg, 2017:
482–487).
We investigate party manifestos in seven West Eur-
opean countries (Sweden, the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium) from
1980 and onward. The party manifestos have been coded
according to the Comparative Agenda Project (CAP) cod-
ing scheme. We corroborate the robustness of our findings
by looking at the CAP data in more detail as well as the
Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data for 25 coun-
tries. We show that where strong labour unions operate in
corporatist systems, political parties will generally pay
more attention to labour market policy.
Beyond the issue competition literature, our findings
also speak to the literature on interest groups and their
interaction with political parties. This is a small, but grow-
ing field (Allern and Bale, 2017; Allern et al., 2007; Otjes
and Rasmussen, 2017; Thomas, 2001; Witko, 2009). The
exchange model is at the core of the theoretical work in this
field: parties offer access to policymaking in exchange, for
example, public support from interest groups. Yet, the
research has so far focused on routine or institutionalized
contacts and has paid less attention to what is exchanged.
By focusing on election manifestos, we are able to get a
grasp of the substance of the exchange.
This article will have the following structure. First, we
discuss the existing theory on issue competition between
parties and deduce some basic expectations about the par-
tisan predictors of attention to labour market issues. Sec-
ond, we turn to the role of interest groups and propose a
number of expectations as to how they affect the attention
to labour market issues. Third, we briefly discuss a number
of controls. Fourth, we will discuss how we will operatio-
nalize these concepts in the method section. Fifth, we show
that the attention political parties devote to the labour mar-
ket is associated with the institutionalized power of trade
unions. Lastly, we conclude on the role of party competi-
tion and interest groups with respect to attention to labour
market issues.
Issue competition between parties
The starting point in the issue competition literature is
issue ownership (Walgrave et al., 2015). Political parties
have some issues that they ‘own’ in the sense that voters
consider them more competent at dealing with such
issues than other parties. Therefore, parties would like
to focus on those issues. However, the literature repeat-
edly finds that this is only half the story. Political parties
may focus disproportionally on their own issues, but at
the same time, they pay considerable attention to the
issues that their opponents own (Dolezal et al., 2013;
Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2015; Meyer and
Wagner, 2016). Thus, parties respond to the issues, which
are emphasized by other parties in the same party system
(Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010, 2015; Steenbergen
and Scott, 2004).
So far, the study of issue competition has focused on
new issues that are emphasized by political entrepreneurs,
such as European integration (Hobolt and de Vries, 2015;
Van de Wardt, 2015). Political entrepreneurs seek to
reshape the political landscape by emphasizing new issues
that are not yet part of the existing lines of conflict. Scant
attention has been paid to bread-and-butter issues related to
the welfare state and the economy (Busemeyer et al., 2013;
Green-Pedersen, 2019a; Green-Pedersen and Jensen, 2019)
although issue competition is just as relevant for such
issues (Green-Pedersen 2019a).
Issue competition is about setting the party system
agenda (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010). The more
successful a party is in this respect, the more it will
benefit electorally. What has not been studied extensively
how forces outside the party system affect whether or not
parties are successful in forcing other parties to pay atten-
tion to their preferred issues. ‘Problem’ indicators such as
number of immigrants or focusing events such as the
Chernobyl disaster in 1986 play a role (Abou-Chadi,
2016; Green-Pedersen, 2019a; Green-Pedersen and Otjes,
2017; Spoon et al., 2014). The role of other actors than
the political parties themselves – such as interest groups –
has, however, largely been neglected (though see Klüver,
2018).
Another key insight regarding the issue competition lit-
erature is the importance of ‘issue characteristics’. Policy
issues differ in terms of the nature of the policy problems
involved and the likelihood of focusing events, but also in
terms of how interests are structured – as classically laid
out by Wilson (1973). Therefore, specific hypotheses about
the dynamics of issue competition should be developed in
relation to specific issues, in this case labour market policy.
What drives party attention to labour
market policy?
As argued, the key dynamic of issue competition is that
parties have preferred issues that they try to get other par-
ties to focus on, other parties that would prefer focus on
different issues. An initial question in relation to labour
market policy is which party ‘owns’ the issue.
Seeberg (2017: 482–487) shows that unemployment is
typically an issue owned by the left. The left focuses on
labour market policies that seek to protect workers from
fickle labour markets, by ensuring fair wages and good
working conditions while also providing benefits and job
retraining for those who are unemployed. A key aim of
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parties to the left is thus to generate more attention to
labour market policy. We can therefore hypothesise:
1. Left–Right Position Hypothesis: The more left-
wing a political party is, the more attention it will
devote to labour market issues.
A second hypothesis is that the stronger the major left-
wing party is in electoral terms, the more attention all par-
ties will pay to labour market issues. We expect that other
parties react to ‘labour’ parties in the same way as they do
to anti-immigration and green parties (Green Pedersen and
Otjes, 2017; Meguid, 2008; Spoon et al., 2014). The idea
that parties respond to strong left-wing parties by increas-
ing attention to their issues can also be found in the power
resource approach to welfare state development. If social
democratic parties are powerful, there may be a contagion
from the left (Huber and Stephens, 2001: 20; Korpi, 1989:
313). This leads to the following hypothesis:
2. Party Competition Hypothesis: The larger the main
centre-left party became in the previous election,
the more attention all parties will devote to labour
market issues.
While the role of parties in shaping attention to issues is
well established, less is known about interest groups.1 The
party politics literature focuses on the idea that parties for-
mulate policies to gain votes and set them apart from the
broader societal context of policy formulation (Hacker and
Pierson, 2014). Yet, just like political parties, interest
groups seek to influence policy. One important way in
which they seek to do this is by defining the political
agenda. We perceive political parties and interest groups
as separate organizations that compete for influence, coop-
erate on common goals and influence each other (Allern
and Bale, 2017).2 The core idea is that the interaction
between parties and labour unions is characterized by
exchange (Allern et al., 2007; Allern and Bale, 2017;
Hacker and Pierson, 2014; Quinn, 2002). Labour unions
want legislation and policy rewards, in particular protective
legislation in the area of employment and social security
(Howell et al., 1992: 1). Party leaders are attentive to such
demands because in exchange for such policy benefits,
labour unions may give political parties electoral support
and provide financial and organizational resources, infor-
mation on specific policies and organization assistance
(Allern and Bale, 2017; Hacker and Pierson, 2014; Klüver,
2018: 4–7). Strong labour unions are also likely to have a
stronger voice in the public debate and be better able to
generate media attention around labour market issues. This
makes it difficult for those parties that would rather avoid
the issue and easy for those parties that want to draw atten-
tion to labour market issues. Therefore, we propose the
following hypothesis:
3. Labour Union Hypothesis: The stronger the labour
unions, the more attention will all parties devote to
labour market issues.
The power of trade unions does not just depend on their
membership. Their power can be institutionalized in cor-
poratist arrangements. Following Jahn (2014), we conceive
of corporatism as having three dimensions: hierarchically
centralized interest organizations (structure dimension),
which engage in concertation with each other and the gov-
ernment in relation to socio-economic policies and wages
(function dimension), which again leads to agreements that
encompass broad segments of the labour market (scope
dimension).
The institutionalized cooperation between the social
partners and the government may institutionalize political
attention on issues that are important to the labour move-
ment (Huber et al., 1993: 718). Corporatism also makes
employers more willing to accept labour market regulation
and social protection (Jensen, 2011: 172–174). If there is
consultation, deals can be struck between social partners
about an extended welfare state where employers accept
the increased costs of social policies in return for other
benefits. A similar logic is likely to apply to political par-
ties: in corporatist systems, political parties do not just offer
policies to convince voters, they are also in constant nego-
tiation with social partners. Therefore, they are more likely
to discuss labour market issues in their manifestos, signal-
ling possible tripartite compromises. Also, corporatist
arrangements work as ‘focusing events’ around labour mar-
ket policy, which generate media attention. This makes it
more likely that political parties will focus on the issues.
Finally, in non-corporatist systems, governments have less
influence over wage negotiations in the private sector.
Therefore, parties in pluralist systems are less likely to
mention preferences related to wage negotiations in their
manifesto because this issue is outside of their control.
4. Corporatism Hypothesis: The more corporatist a
polity is, the more attention parties will devote to
labour market issues.
There are also reasons to believe that the effect might be
in the opposite direction or that corporatism has no effect:
thus, many authors have observed a decline of corporatism
and a rise of lobbyism, which may lead to the belief that
corporatism is no longer relevant (Christiansen and Rom-
metvedt, 1999; Rommetvedt et al., 2013; but see Jahn, 2014
for a critical discussion). One might thus also argue that
corporatism is meant to depoliticize issues. Creating a
negotiation space between trade unions and employers’
organizations outside of politics may be one way to keep
certain issues away from (party) politics.3
Hacker and Pierson (2014: 647) observe that ‘the insti-
tutional terrain’ has a strong effect on how groups organize,
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with whom they align, and to what extent they can influ-
ence policies. For this case, trade union strength and cor-
poratism are thus likely to interact: Under corporatism,
labour unions are more powerful actors as they have a seat
in tripartite negotiations about policy. Therefore, political
parties may want to talk more about matters that directly
interest labour unions, such as labour market policies. This
may be a way for political parties to signal their willingness
to cooperate with labour unions once in government. When
trade unions are strong actors, it is difficult for even parties
that prioritize other issues to ignore labour market policy.
5. Corporatism-Labour Union Hypothesis: The more
corporatist the polity is, the stronger effect that
labour unions will have on the level of attention
all parties will devote to labour market issues.
Control variables
The attention parties pay to labour market issues does not
just reflect party priorities or even the priorities of other
powerful actors in the political system. External events
such as natural disasters and media reports on social or
economic problems, for example, unemployment, can also
force parties to pay attention to issues, at least in the short
to medium term (Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Green-
Pedersen, 2019a; Green-Pedersen and Jensen, 2019). For
the labour market, the actual level of unemployment is a
good indicator of the importance that citizens attach to the
issue and thus allows us to incorporate the riding-the-wave
perspective where parties react to the public importance
citizens attach to an issue (Klüver, 2018). Therefore, we
expect that the higher the unemployment, the more parties
will prioritize policy solutions pertaining to employment
issues.
Over the last decades, the relevance of the class theory
of politics has declined in Western countries as working-
class voters have oriented themselves away from the left
(Houtman et al., 2009), and parties to the left have
embraced post-materialist policies, such as the environ-
ment. Support for environmental protection may be partic-
ularly at odds with support for labour issues:
environmentalists are willing to accept lower economic
growth to protect the environment. Therefore, we expect
that the less pro-environment a political party is, the more
attention it will devote to labour market issues.
Methods
In this study, we use a number of different data sources to
show the effect of party strategy, interest groups and eco-
nomic circumstances on political attention. Online Appendix
1 lists the availability of data, and Online Appendix 2 lists
descriptives. To ease the interpretation, all independent
variables have been standardized so that their minima are zero
and their maxima are one.
Our dependent variable is the level of attention, which
individual parties pay to labour issues in their party mani-
festos. Each party manifesto is coded according to the CAP
coding system. This system is based on policy issues that
are divided into main topics (e.g. macroeconomic policy)
and subtopics (e.g. inflation or taxation within the category
of macroeconomic policy). The coding system was origi-
nally developed by Baumgartner and Jones and contained
19 main topics and more than 200 subtopics. Later, other
research teams made national versions of the codebooks by
modifying the American codebook. Cross-national com-
parison was then secured by means of a crosswalk system
(Bevan, 2019). The data sets were established indepen-
dently for each country and later merged into one data set.
Green-Pedersen (2019b) presents details about the coding
for each country. In all countries, trained human coders
coded the documents using either natural sentences or
quasi-sentences as coding units.4 Since each coding unit
is coded at the subtopic level, the system is completely
flexible in terms of generating new major categories by
aggregating subtopics.
We focus on the category ‘labour’. In the master code-
book, this category has a number of subcategories, that is,
‘worker safety and protection’, ‘employment training and
workforce development (active labour market policy)’,
‘employee benefits’, ‘employee relations and labour
unions’, ‘fair labour standards’ and ‘youth employment and
child labour’. We exclude sentences concerning the subto-
pic of labour migration because it is more related to the
issue of immigration. We included the subtopic of ‘unem-
ployment’, normally placed under the main topic of macro-
economics.5 The CAP measure specifically measures issue
saliency and not the policy direction: It may also contain
‘right-wing’ proposals concerning the labour market, such
as eliminating protection against dismissal. Our argument
is that corporatism and union strength raise the saliency of
the issue, not that political parties necessarily pursue union-
friendly policies. This is the variable ‘CAP Labour’.
We include a number of robustness tests in Online
Appendix 2. First, we use the depth of the CAP coding
scheme to analyse a specific subset of labour market poli-
cies, that is, active labour market policies and cash benefits
related to the labour market (unemployment benefits, sick-
ness benefits, etc.). This is done to test whether the findings
are the same when only including attention to ‘labour-
friendly’ subissues: it consists of two subcategories from
the CAP Labour-category ‘Active Labour Market Policies’
and ‘Benefits to Employees’.
Second, the CAP data are available for seven countries
and from the early 1980s and until the mid-2010s. While
these data give us considerable depth and flexibility, they
are also limited in scope. Therefore, we also use the CMP
data set, which has a greater geographic scope and covers a
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longer period. Two categories in this codebook explicitly
concern labour issues (per701 (Labour Groups Positive)
and per702 (Labour Groups Negative)). We construct one
variable CMP Labour, which includes both positive and
negative mentions. This contains all sentences that refer
positively or negatively to labour groups, the working class,
labour unions, the unemployed and calls for more jobs,
better working conditions, fair wages and so on. Thus,
while the CAP looks at the saliency of a policy area, the
CMP looks at the saliency of the group in manifestos. We
further focus on advanced industrialized countries to ana-
lyse countries compared with the CAP data.6 Combined
with other restrictions regarding the number of countries
and years, the CMP analyses have 25 countries and a max-
imum of 797 cases. The CAP and CMP variables concern
(mostly) the same documents, but the coding strategies are
different. Therefore, there is a correlation between the two
variables, but of intermediate strength.7 If both data sets
show the same results despite different coding schemes and
codes, this provides strong evidence for the hypotheses we
propose.
To test the Left–Right Position Hypothesis, we need a
measure of party positioning for a longer time period. To
ensure that the measures of the dependent and independent
variables are truly exogenous, we use expert surveys to
establish left–right positions. There have been five projects
using expert surveys to collect data since the Second World
War: Benoit and Laver (2006), Castles and Mair (1984),
Huber and Inglehart (1995), Morgan (1976) and the Chapel
Hill Expert Survey (CHES) of Hooghe et al. (2010). We use
the general left–right dimension from these data sets. This
means that while economic policy positions may play a role
in parties placed left or right, so do their positions on moral
issues, immigration and other issues. This provides a more
conservative test of our hypothesis than if we were to use a
measure of merely parties’ economic left–right attitudes.8
We have left–right estimates for 1897 party-election-year
combinations, between 1963 and 2017. The CHES and the
Benoit and Laver (2006) surveys use similar items to mea-
sure environmental attitudes. Both ask experts to place
parties on a dimension where the extremes represent either
prioritizing environmental protection or economic growth,
but this limits the scope of the analyses that are using this
variable to more recent decades. We have data for 946
party–election–year combinations. In Online Appendix 2,
we also look at models without the environmental
variable.9
To test the Party Competition Hypothesis, we look at the
size of the main party of the centre-left. The codebook of
the CMP includes the party family of the party for every
manifesto. We look at parties in the social democratic cate-
gory.10 If there are multiple social democratic parties, we
chose the one that was the largest in the last election. This is
often the largest party to the left, but in some cases, a
communist party was larger. We assign the share of the
votes in the previous election. These data were also
included in the CMP data set. This variable was available
for all elections, except for the first elections in every data
set. As a robustness test, we also included models in Online
Appendix 2 that control the attention which the largest
centre-left party paid to labour market issues in their man-
ifesto for the previous election. Parties may not just
respond to the size of this party, but also to the attention
that it raises.11
To test the Corporatism Hypothesis, we use data from
Jahn (2014) who provides estimates of corporatism based
on Visser’s database (2016). This measure of corporatism
taps into all the dimensions that are relevant for our hypoth-
esis: Under corporatism the government can influence
wage negotiations and labour unions, and that employers’
organizations are involved in policymaking. This measure
is available for 27 countries, between 1960 and 2010, in a
total of 2063 manifestos. To ensure that we look at a causal
effect, we use the level of corporatism in the year preceding
the election. Note that this measure of corporatism is
dynamic: It can wax and wane over time as the institutional
ties between governments, trade unions and employers
intensify or weaken.
To test the Unionization Hypothesis, we use data from
Visser (2016). This data set has comparable data on the
share of the workforce that are members of a labour union.
These data are available between 1960 and 2013 for 26
countries, although for five countries estimates are not
available for every election. We use the level of unioniza-
tion in the year before the election. There is a moderate
correlation between unionization and corporatism.12 In the
CAP data set, there are corporatist countries with strong
unions (Sweden), corporatist countries with weak unions
(the Netherlands), non-corporatist countries with strong
unions (the United Kingdom) and non-corporatist countries
with weak unions (France).
To control for the level of unemployment, we use data
from the OECD (2018), which collect comparable esti-
mates of unemployment in a large number of countries,
in some cases since 1950, in most cases since 1980, but
data are not available for every year for all eight countries.
Therefore, we have data for 1393 cases. We use the level of
unemployment the year before the election to prevent that
our findings are the result of reversed causality.
We use a multilevel least squares regression with ran-
dom effects for elections, since at that level country-level
measures, like unemployment, that are the same for multi-
ple cases are introduced.
Results
Before we turn to our results, we will briefly look at the
descriptive results of the main independent variable, the
level of attention political parties pay to labour market issues
as defined above. We will look at this cross-nationally and
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within party families. Figure 1 shows the average across
parties per election for different countries. We see that aver-
age party attention declines from above 12% in the early
1980s to around 7% in the 2010s. Attention to labour
declines in Denmark, France, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom. The attention is relatively stable in Belgium and
Germany. In Sweden, the attention oscillates.
Figure 2 shows the patterns per party family. They show
that the greatest attention to labour is among the traditional
working parties, the communists/socialists and the social
democrats. Interestingly, the green parties that stand in
between the communist/socialists and the social democrats
pay less attention to the issue than these two. The green
parties are more likely to focus on new political issues,
particularly the environment. This supports our notion that
both the left–right position and the party’s position on
environmentalism play a role. Among the other party fam-
ilies, the attention on labour is considerably lower. Nation-
alist parties to the utmost right on the figure pay the least
attention to the issue.
Next, we will examine what can explain these patterns.
Table 1 presents a number of regression models. Online
Appendix 2 offers a number of robustness tests.13 First, we
test the Right–Left Hypothesis, that is, the idea that left-
wing parties will focus more on labour issues than right-
wing parties. The idea is that the left owns labour issues and
Average value of ‘CAP Labour’per year. 
















































































































Figure 1. Trends in attention to labour 1980–2016. Average value of ‘CAP Labour’ per year. CAP: Comparative Agenda Project.
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that right-wing parties will want to ignore them. In each
model we run, left–right positioning has a sizeable and
significant effect on the attention parties pay to labour
issues. The same is true for all robustness tests in Online
Appendix 2. In model 3, the uttermost left-wing party pays
about 12 points more attention to labour than the least left-
wing party, which corresponds to about two standard devia-
tions (SDs) of this variable. This clearly corroborates the
Left–Right Position Hypothesis.
The Party Competition Hypothesis proposed that the
larger the centre-left party, the more attention will other
parties give to labour issues, because it should indicate
that focusing on labour issues is a successful strategy.
We find no support for this hypothesis at all. Rather, in
the three models in Table 1, the relationship is negative.
All the coefficients in Online Appendix 2 are also neg-
ative and significant in less than half of the cases. This
may indicate that focusing on labour issues – and in
particular on the interests of labour groups – is less
attractive when labour parties are stronger. In the con-
clusion below, we reflect further on the possible under-
lying reasons for this unexpected result. For now, it
suffices to conclude that large labour parties do not
elicit more attention to labour, so the Party Competition
Hypothesis should be rejected.14
Next, we look at the role of interest groups with three
hypotheses: The Labour Union Hypothesis proposes that
the stronger the labour unions, the more attention will par-
ties devote to labour. This variable is added in model 2. We
do not find that there is a significant direct effect of the size
of labour unions on the attention to labour, although the
effect is in the correct direction. In Online Appendix 2, all
but one coefficient for unionization is insignificant. This
indicates that in itself labour union strength does not boost
attention to labour.
The Corporatism Hypothesis proposes that in corporatist
systems, parties will devote more attention to labour. This
variable is added in model 2. The coefficient is in the
correct direction but is neither significant nor very strong.
Only one-third of the coefficients for corporatism in Online
Appendix 2 are significant. The models also differ in the
direction of the effect. Only three of seven coefficients for
corporatism in Online Appendix 2 are significant. The
models also differ in the direction of the effect. Thus, the
evidence for the Corporatism Hypothesis is weak.
On the other hand, it seems that the combination of
corporatism and trade unionism boosts party attention to
labour (as hypothesized in the Corporatism-Labour Union
Hypothesis). We visualize the pattern (from model 3) in
Figure 3: It shows that when the level of corporatism is
strong, the effect of labour union strength on attention to
labour becomes stronger, significantly and substantially, in
line with the hypothesis. In non-corporatist countries,
strong labour unions weaken rather than strengthen atten-
tion to labour. In corporatist countries, their strength
increases attention to labour. This effect is strong and sig-
nificant. All but one robustness check in Online Appendix 2
supports this finding.15 This is important because interac-
tion on system-level variables like union strength and cor-
poratism may depend strongly on the selection of countries.
Both in the smaller sample of seven West European coun-
tries (in the CAP data) and in the broader range of 25
advanced industrial democracies (in the CMP data), this
interaction works in much the same way. All in all, we find
sufficient evidence that in recent decades, strong labour
unions in combination with high levels of corporatism lead
to more attention to labour. The fact that we find strong
support for this hypothesis in both the CAP and the CMP
databases is notable: In terms of both the methodological
approach and the empirical patterns, these measures are
quite different.
Next, we look at our control variables, the first of these
is unemployment. The idea is that the higher the unemploy-
ment, the greater is the attention to the issue. Model 3
indicates that in-between situations – between the lowest
and the highest unemployment – parties pay about 20 per-
centage points more attention to labour, a very sizeable and
significant effect. This effect can be seen in all analyses
with the CAP data in Online Appendix 2. In the analyses
with CMP data in Online Appendix 2, this effect is less
consistent.16
Finally, we look at the position of parties on the dimen-
sion between environmental protection and economic
growth. In itself, anti-environmentalism has a negative
relationship with the different measures of attention to
labour,17 as left-wing parties tend to be more pro-environ-








































































Figure 2. Averages of attention to labour per party family. Aver-
age value of ‘CAP Labour’ per year. Parties arranged from left to
right by average left–right position of the party family. Party fam-
ilies as per CMP data set. CAP: Comparative Agenda Project;
CMP: Comparative Manifesto Project.
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parties, the pattern shows the expected direction. Thus, in
model 3, the least environmentalist party pays six percent-
age points more attention to labour. This is a significant
effect of about one SD of the data. This effect persists in
every model included in Online Appendix 2. Note that this
variable constrains the N considerably. The significant pat-
terns in analyses of the CAP data are corroborated when
this variable is dropped.
All in all, attention to labour issues reflects party char-
acteristics and the relations with interest groups. Left-wing
parties emphasize labour issues. Trade union strength also
plays a role, but only in corporatist systems when their
power is entrenched. The size of the centre-left party does
not influence the attention to labour.
Conclusion
The aim of this article was to study to what extent and
under what conditions interest groups are able to shape
issue attention to specific policies. We added an important
comparative perspective in addition to Klüver’s (2018)
study, which examined the influence of interest groups on
multiple issues in one country. We focused on labour mar-
ket issues because here, we would be able to contrast par-
tisan and interest group effects starkly. We saw that when
the power of trade unions is institutionalized in corporatist
arrangements, the attention to labour market issues is
greater. Our results are robust, when we look at both the
CAP data covering 7 countries and the CMP data covering
25 countries. The same applies when looking at general
patterns for labour and when zooming in on specific cate-
gories concerning active labour market policies.
We compared the importance of party competition to the
importance of trade union power. The evidence is squarely
on the union side: political parties pay more attention to
labour issues when unions are strong and their power is
institutionalized through corporatism. This shows that elec-
tion manifestos are not just part of party competition, but
also important signalling devices between political parties
and interest groups. Parties seek to court trade unions
(Allern and Bale, 2017): Parties have to address the issues
trade unions raise when they are strong and when this
power is formalized in corporatist structures. By paying
attention to labour in their manifestos, political parties sig-
nal their willingness to cooperate with trade unions once in
power. As in Klüver’s (2018) study of Germany, we show
Table 1. Regression models.
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Right–left position 11.83*** (1.66) 12.02*** (1.89) 12.08*** (1.88)
Unemployment 26.51*** (3.72) 26.52*** (3.96) 20.34*** (4.50)
Size of the centre-left party 3.78 (2.48) 4.75 (2.93) 2.24 (2.98)
Corporatism – 0.10 (2.11) 10.58** (4.97)
Unionization – 1.02 (1.50) 28.87** (12.92)
Corporatism  Unionization – – 46.47** (19.98)
Anti-environmental position 5.75*** (1.70) 5.62*** (1.92) 5.74*** (1.92)
Constant 4.98*** (1.96) 4.88*** (2.82) 1.60 (3.84)
N 247 211 211
Elections 37 31 31
Loglikelihood 691 597 594
R2 level 1 0.39 0.40 0.42
R2 level 2 0.59 0.61 0.66
Random effect 1.47 (0.38) 1.50 (0.42) 1.28 (0.41)
Residual 3.78 (0.19) 3.89 (0.21) 3.89 (0.21)
Note: CAP: Comparative Agenda Project. Dependent variable: CAP Labour.
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.






























Figure 3. Average marginal effects of unionization on attention
to labour at different levels of corporatism. Based on model 3,
with 90% confidence interval.
8 Party Politics XX(X)
that interest group influence matters when it comes to polit-
ical attention, but our comparative study also shows that
this influence strongly depends on the institutional context,
which parties and interest groups operate in. One puzzling,
but consistent, result is that at low levels of corporatism,
strong trade unions have a negative effect on attention to
labour. In non-corporatist systems, parties pay more atten-
tion to labour when trade unions are weak as opposed to
strong. An explanation might be that in non-corporatist
systems – in the absence of trade unions – political parties
take over the mediating role of the interest of employees
that trade unions otherwise have. When trade unions are
strong, they take over this mediating role themselves.
Future research may want to look in particular at under-
standing attention patterns in non-corporatist systems. All
in all, the empirical patterns indicate that the relationship
between interest groups and political parties is more com-
plex than the literature on issue competition has so far
assumed.
The finding that union power and not party power boosts
attention to labour stands in contrast to the party political
literature on competition regarding non-economic issues.
There, the idea has been that the stronger the party that
owned an issue, the more would the established parties
focus on such issues. We found no clear relationship
between the size of the main centre-left party and the atten-
tion to labour. There are no indications that large social
democratic parties lead to more attention to labour, but
rather that the relationship, if anything, is negative. Two
factors may explain this: The first factor relates to the elec-
tions. The larger the centre-left party, the more likely it is
that it will have the support of all voters concerned with
labour issues. Under these conditions, it is likely that com-
petition between large catch-all parties will focus on the
centrist swing voters who will care about issues that to do
not map to the left or right, such as labour. The second
factor is related to coalition formation (cf. Green-
Pedersen and Otjes, 2017). If the main party of the
centre-left is large, it is likely to be able to govern on its
own. If the main party of the centre-left is small, it is more
likely that a coalition will be needed between this centre-
left party and other parties, and if parties expect to govern
with the main party of the centre-left, they will need to
prepare their own labour market agenda, in order to offer
alternatives to those on the centre-left’s agenda.
Future research may want to expand on the issues raised
in this article and study the phenomenon beyond the limita-
tions of this study: The first avenue for further research
may be an examination of the role of interest groups with
respect to the attention political parties pay to other issues.
This comparative article has taken a limited perspective by
focusing on one issue and one kind of interest group. Future
research may want to look at the political role that employ-
ers’ organizations play with respect to attention to issues
that are of special concern to them, such as business
regulation or corporate taxation. Farmer groups may want
gain influence on agricultural issues. Future research may
want to look at the effect of strong business groups on
political attention and the role of institutional context.
Moreover, this article has focused on bread-and-butter
issues, but a similar logic may also apply to new political
issues. Thus, it may be interesting to study the role that
environmental groups play in raising the salience of the
environment. Also, future analyses may want to pay
attention to the organizational connections between par-
ties and interest groups, in particular trade unions and the
role they play in shaping the agendas of parties (cf.
Allern and Bale, 2017).
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Notes
1. Even in studies of issue competition concerning the environ-
ment, where interest groups are widely represented, their
potential role in issue competition is ignored (Abou-Chadi,
2016; Green-Pedersen, 2019a: chapter 9; Spoon et al., 2014).
2. This is in opposition to a new strand in the American party
literature, in particular where parties are understood as coali-
tions of interest groups (Bawn et al., 2012). This perspective
fits better on the American parties that lack strong internal
structures than on the European parties that have strong inter-
nal organizations.
3. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this
suggestion.
4. The Dutch data are coded with paragraphs as coding units.
5. The Dutch codebook has subtopics relating to ‘Employee
influence’ (1510) and ‘Unemployment benefits’ (1307)
which are not placed under the main topic of ‘Labour’ in the
Dutch codebook, but which are included in labour market
policy in this article.
6. We did not use data from Central and Eastern Europe coun-
tries due to special codes of manifestos for post-communist
democracies.
7. Pearson’s r is 0.37, significant at the 0.01 level; more correla-
tions can be found in Online Appendix 2.
8. We assume that these estimates can be applied 10 years for-
ward and backward. If there are multiple surveys that provide
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estimates, we chose the closest. If there are multiple surveys
that are ‘the closest’, we chose the one that is executed after
the elections.
9. The environmental and the left–right measure are negatively
correlated (Pearson’s r: 0.75, significant at the 0.01 level).
More correlations in Online Appendix 2.
10. In the United States, we took the Democratic Party as the
functional equivalent of a social democratic party (cf. Allern
and Bale, 2017)
11. If parties respond to saliency of labour market issues in the
manifestos of other parties, it may very well be that our
analyses underestimate the effect of the truly exogenous vari-
ables because part of the effect is direct through this variable
and another part of this effect is indirect through other parties’
manifestos. This means that our estimates are conservative
estimates. Our N is too small for a more complex analysis to
deal with this issue.
12. Pearson’s r is 0.36. More correlations in Online Appendix 2.
13. These are models that use alternative operationalizations of
the dependent variable (CAP Active Labour Market Policies
and CMP Labour Issues; models that exclude the anti-
environmental position variable; models that the centre-left
party’s government participation; models that include the
centre-left party’s attention to labour in previous years and
alternative operationalization of unemployment (specifically
for the CMP data).
14. Online Appendix 2 delves in the possibility that the lagged
share of attention that these centre-left parties pay to labour
issues affects attention to labour issues by other parties. Here,
we find some evidence in both the CAP and the CMP models.
We find a significant effect – for every additional percentage
point of attention political parties pay to labour issues, the
other parties increase their attention by between 0.15 and 0.3
percentage points. Parties thus respond to the attention the
centre-left parties pay to this issue. We do not find such
pattern for the CAP attention to active labour market policies.
In Online Appendix 2, we also checked whether centre-left
party’s accumulative power contributed to more attention to
labour, that is, whether the share of years’ social democratic
parties had been in power before writing the manifesto con-
tributed to higher levels of attention to labour. A significantly
positive effect was found in some models when looking at
CAP Active Labour Market Policies, when unionization and
corporatism were included and when looking at CMP when
those two variables were not included. It did not have a sig-
nificantly positive effect on CAP Labour. This indicates that
it has no consistent effect on attention to labour.
15. The interaction between trade union strength and corporat-
ism is not significant for the CMP data if the environmental
variable is dropped. This may be due to omitted variable
bias (i.e. only we control for differences between post-
materialist and materialist parties, this difference between
countries is significant) or due to period effects (the pattern
does not hold once cases from the 1980s are included in the
analysis).
16. In only one in three CMP analyses, this effect can be seen.
The explanation for this is that in the CAP data, we deal with
relatively similar West European countries where unemploy-
ment ranges between 2% and 10%. The variance of unem-
ployment in that analysis is mainly is overtime. The CMP
data span more countries including ones that have higher
levels of structural unemployment, like Spain and Greece.
The variance in that analysis is mainly between countries.
The attention to labour does not follow country differences
in unemployment. A secondary analysis with relative unem-
ployment (i.e. unemployment divided by the country mean)
shows that attention to labour in the CMP data also follows
the business cycle.
17. Pearson’s r is 0.21 for CAP Labour (significant at least at
the 0.05 level).
18. Pearson’s r is 0.79 (significant at the 0.01 level).
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